The analytical lens of "continuity and change" has long been used to interpret Indonesian foreign policy (IFP). The fundamental bebas-aktif (free and active) doctrine has remained essentially unchanged, despite each president leaving their own mark. Although it is still early to grasp a broader perspective, indications from the administration of President Prabowo Subianto, compared to his predecessor Jokowi (2014-2024), point to the continuation of this trend, albeit with an increased emphasis on hard-power capabilities and multilateral engagement in IFP.  By examining President Prabowo's multilateralism tendency, this piece will evaluate IFP’s niche approach towards global politics during his tenure.

Multilateralism and Domestic Legitimacy

One precise dimension is that President Prabowo is bringing multilateralism back to the IFP. Compared to Jokowi, President Prabowo has a greater ambition to bring Indonesia back onto the world stage. Recently, by participating in the General Debate of the UN General Assembly, Prabowo demonstrated Indonesia’s request for a more active role in global conflicts. Jokowi, for instance, during his ten years in office, never made an in-person appearance at the UN General Assembly; instead, he assigned Indonesia's representation to Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi or gave speeches virtually during the COVID-19 pandemic. The significant part of this case also serves as a litmus test for Prabowo to gauge domestic reactions to foreign policy decisions. In his speech, Prabowo’s statement on Israel’s security may bring some domestic unrest from Islamic domestic actors. However, Nahdlat’ul Ulama, Indonesia’s largest Islamic organisation, shows a general support for Prabowo. Prabowo seems to have established domestic legitimacy, especially in light of Indonesia's political environment, where influential domestic players frequently scrutinise foreign policy choices. Prior presidents, such as Megawati Sukarnoputri and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, faced domestic opposition during their tenures due to their contentious foreign policy decisions, particularly Indonesia’s cooperation with the US in the fight against international terrorism in 2001 and Indonesia's support for UN Security Council Resolution 1747 on Iran in 2007. To reduce the likelihood of similar domestic opposition to his own foreign policy agenda, Prabowo appears to be mindful of cultivating support from key societal and political constituencies.

Leadership Background and Hard-Power Emphasis

Another dimension is how a leader's background shapes their worldview. The choice of Sugiono as Foreign Minister is analysed as Prabowo’s personal ambitions to direct and create hegemony on IFP. Indonesia is seen as the natural-born leader of ASEAN, and ASEAN has protected itself as the cornerstone of IFP for a long time. Sugiono's absence from the informal ASEAN Foreign Ministers' meeting in Bangkok in December 2024 underscores Indonesia's diminishing emphasis on ASEAN in its foreign policy, as it prioritises other dimensions. One should remember that Prabowo has an army background, which dates back to the New Order period. His foreign policy aims to bring Indonesia into the world stage by enhancing Indonesia’s hard power, thereby giving Indonesia a voice in the region and in the realm of realpolitik. He often emphasises in his speeches the importance of nationalism, patriotism, and Indonesia's place in world politics, by enhancing its military power. The recent convergence with Türkiye is solid proof of that; by rapproaching another middle power, Indonesia is trying to increase its defence capabilities as well as protect its non-bloc stance. Türkiye’s growing influence outside of its immediate region is evidenced by its recent military developments, such as the operational use of Bayraktar TB2 drones in Libya and Ukraine and its active diplomatic engagement in Ethiopia and Somalia. These changes demonstrate a strategic parallel in the development of hard power and support Indonesia's decision to align with another emerging middle power. Prabowo, as a former general of the TNI (Indonesian Armed Forces), is aware that without a strong defence force, Indonesia will neither be a mediator, bridge builder, nor an influential actor in ASEAN nor in global politics. This stance matches his strong Javanese way of thinking, which he often emphasises in presidential campaigns ‘nguluruk tanpa bolo, menang tanpo ngasorake’ (Advance without an army,  prevail without humiliating). This is a unique move, as Indonesia prefers to approach another middle power rather than major ones to avoid offending them. This approach also captures the bebas-aktif (free and active foreign policy) tradition and may help reduce the question of whether Indonesia chooses West or East as its side, since currently Türkiye does not significantly represent either of those blocs. 

Another challenge to Indonesia's free and active stance is the decision to join BRICS. Prabowo’s decision to join the BRICS is to enhance its visibility and influence as well as solidify Indonesia’s position in the Global South. Yet this is more than that. Prabowo is a person who believes in taking Indonesia to the stage where it belongs. Even when a comparison is made, the reason Jokowi refrained from joining BRICS is that he thought Indonesia would no longer be free; besides, he believes that BRICS would not bring sufficient economic benefits to the homeland, as he prioritised economic diplomacy first. Yet despite the financial risks that Jakarta face from the US, Prabowo may want to be remembered as “Paku Alam”  (a title used for Javanese Kings, meaning “The Nailer Of The Universe”) and show it to the Western counterparts by proudly taking a photo side by side with Xi, Kim Jong Un and Putin. Considering hard power capacities, Indonesia still work hard to position itself as an influential regional player. However, this is where Prabowo pursues a different foreign policy understanding than Yudhoyono and Jokowi, by choosing sides and cooperating with regional middle powers, such as Turkiye, to increase these capabilities. 

Continuity, Change, and a Distinct Path

Although Prabowo’s foreign policy approach may appear complex or even be described as “all style, no substance” or a “gado-gado” policy, this piece finds that Prabowo considers the past experiences of the IFP and attempts to implement a unique approach. Although still early to play major roles in Indo-Pacific,  Prabowo realised that the structural and anarchic position in the Indo-Pacific will remain between China and the USA, and so will Indonesia, unless Indonesia increases its material capabilities. Therefore, convergence with Türkiye is not surprising to achieve this role. Second, SBY was criticised because his foreign policy yielded little tangible benefit for domestic politics. In contrast, Jokowi appeared to distance Indonesia from multilateralism by reducing foreign policy essentially to bilateral relationships. Prabowo, however, has already taken a distinct step in Indonesian politics by integrating his domestic political strategies, strengthening domestic legitimacies, and deliberately choosing unique multilateralism in IFP.