Many Observers were surprised when the African Union (AU) elected Djibouti’s long serving foreign minister, Mahamoud Ali Youssouf, instead of the popular Raila Odinga as the new chairperson of the AU Commission on the 15^th of February 2025. However, his ascension is very contentious and raises serious questions over the AU’s credibility in defending democratic principles and promoting stability across the continent. For over two decades, Youssouf was a political fixture in Djibouti’s authoritarian regime, and leads now an institution ostensibly committed to democracy, governance, and security. His election not only reflects contradictions with the values of the AU, but also the geopolitics and ideological shifts that are changing the future of Africa.

A Diplomatic Veteran with an Authoritarian Legacy

With a population of just over one million people, Djibouti has used its strategic location at the mouth of the Red Sea to exert an outsized African and international diplomatic power. As a host for military bases for the United States, China, France and Japan, Djibouti has perfected geopolitical balancing despite being one of the most entrenched autocracies on the continent. In power since 1999 as the handpicked successor to his uncle, Hassan Gouled Aptidon, who had ruled Djibouti since independence in 1977: President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh has throttled opposition, curtailed press freedoms and have used disenfranchisement of the population as the basis for further extensions of his power through constitutional manipulations. As Guelleh’s chief diplomat since 2005, Youssouf has been essential in blotting out Djibouti from international scrutiny and acquiring lucrative economic and military commitments. Youssouf’s long history in this system also creates very real questions about his willingness or capacity to advance democratic values in the AU. His chairperson post may further erode the credibility of the institution in holding leaders to account for governance failures and election rigging.

Africa, a Continent at a Crossroads: Military Coups and Democratic Reversals

Youssouf takes over the AU’s leadership at a precarious moment. Over the past four years, West African countries have witnessed a resurgence of military coups: Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Guinea all have been ruled by the military. As highlighted in the Eight Priorities for the African Union in 2025, once touted as a post-revolution success story, Sudan has gone into a devastating civil war. Meanwhile, several countries stalwarts long time members of the AU, continue with impunity to repress opposition and rig elections.

The AU’s response to these crises has been inconsistent. It has suspended some coup-led governments but has done little to reinforce democratic institutions against autocrats who use legal and extralegal means to degrade them. Electing a chairperson from an authoritarian regime again is a further retreat of democracy promotion. As opposed to countering, or even standing firm against authoritarianism, the AU is at risk of legitimizing authoritarianism at the highest levels of its own institutions.

The Geopolitical Context: A Shift Away from the West?

The AU’s leadership transition also coincides with the increase in the growth of African skepticism of Western interventions into governance and security affairs across the African continent. Openly in line with Russia and China, new bloc of leaders led by Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger see the traditional AU alignment with Western led institutions as obsolete and counterproductive.

Youssouf’s background suggests he may be sympathetic to this shift. For long, The Horn of Africa nation Djibouti has been the host of competing global powers while having a transactional connection with the West. Under his leadership, the AU may move further away from the Western pressure to enforce democratic norms, through a focus on non-interference practices that protect authoritarian rule which could be strengthened as a result of Trump’s second coming where he has previously poured praises and maintain close relations with dictators.

Such a realignment may make institutions such as the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the African Peer Review Mechanism less impactful in holding governments accountable. If the AU moves towards a model where sovereignty trumps governance, it will be difficult to reverse Africa’s growing democratic decline.

Economic and Security Implications

Beyond governance, there could be wide reaching economic and security implications from Youssouf’s election. The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) lauded as a transformational intra-African trade project, needs good institutional leadership to succeed. However, political unwillingness within member states has prevented implementation so far. If the AU under Youssouf prioritizes sovereignty over integration, AfCFTA may be shoved into further stagnation denying Africa a very vital economic boost.

As regards security, the AU has enormous challenges on its hands including against terrorism in the Sahel, resurgence of rebellion in the Congo, and fragility in the Horn of Africa. While authoritarian, Djibouti has played an important role as a partner to the West in the fight against terrorism. Whether Youssouf will use his experience and new position to increase continental security cooperation or to spare repressive governments from scrutiny remains a very wide open question.

Can the AU Regain Credibility?

Youssouf’s election brings out a larger existential question: What is the AU’s role in shaping Africa’s future after the widely regarded 8 years of poor leadership from Moussa Faki? If democratic norms are not enforced, autocratic leaders are allowed to continue to dominate and external interferences are not curtailed, the AU risks turning into a ceremonial body in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, that is nothing more than a place where power is concentrated in the hands of a few.  However, there are still opportunities for the AU to assert its relevance.

For one, the AU should redefine it role into that of a mediator of transitions rather than a spectator of democratic decline. This would involve imposing its own charters at a higher level of consistency, especially the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Good Governance, strengthening the mandate of the African Court of Human and People's Rights, increasing the capacity of electoral monitoring mechanisms, and embarking on various initiatives to ensure that the AU Commission operates without external interference. Meanwhile, ECOWAS, SADC, EAC, ECCAS and other regional blocs too should be involved in enforcing governance standards. The AU should also see to the full implementation of the AfCFTA, which when fully implemented, will capture an economic area that will be the fifth-largest economy in the world. The AfCFTA holds the potential to increase the rate of economic development and industrialization, attract investments, spread good practices and encourage inclusiveness that benefits marginalised communities. For the union to regain legitimacy, leaders must be made to be held accountable even if it means rocking the boat to challenge the status quo.

Secondly, there should be a proper legal binding framework with enforcement mechanisms. The AU should go beyond advisory laws and non binding resolutions by the creation of a Continental Legal Enforcement Mechanism (CLEM), an independent body that will help the AU charters especially in matters of governance and issues of human rights, is one practical step forward. If member states do not fulfill their commitments (for instance, by not respecting electoral processes or prompt democratic transition), then they should automatically be subject to sanctions which could include restrictions on AU funding and also on membership of regional trade agreements. Additionally, the powerless Pan-African Parliament (PAP) should achieve its goal of having its members elected by universal suffrage rather than being selected by member state legislatures as a start, to make it more representative and have a mandate. The parliament should also be given legislative powers beyond its current role of issuing model laws. The incremental approach could be achieved by starting from points of regional consensus such as trade, security cooperation and climate action. These fields would be a demonstration of the AU's ability to take binding decisions and a basis for further authority expansion.

One other avenue is in the process of inclusion. The AU’s credibility is undermined by the automatic inclusion of all African states, regardless of governance quality unlike in the EU. Some new Performance Based Membership Model could be developed to become a full member of the union with benefits of AU in terms of access to infrastructure funding and trade facilitation being tied to democratic and human rights principles. Such incentives would be tangible and not merely the ineffective public condemnations that characterise AU interventions today.

There should also be financial autonomy at the AU, as one of its greatest weaknesses lies in its financial reliance on external donors as over 85% of its programme budget comes from sources such as the EU, China, and the US, limiting its ability to act independently. Thus, the AU should leverage members' contributions to strengthen its autonomy. With such sustained revenue, the AU would reduce its very huge dependence on foreign actors for revenue and would be able to operate with greater credibility when dealing with governance failures.

In addition, the AU should not rely only on incumbents to have a say but must secure a space for alternative political voices and the African citizens, so that in its decisions the aspirations of the people become the focus and not just upholders of power. The apex organ of the AU, should establish a Continental Civic Engagement Platform that allows for civil society groups and individuals to directly petition the AU on matters of concern. This could be linked to a People’s Assembly, an advisory body within the Pan-Africa Parliament PAP that regularly consults with grassroots organizations. Greater public participation would enhance the AU’s legitimacy and make it more responsive to the needs of ordinary Africans.

Ultimately, all these requires political willingness by AU member states to gradually sacrifice their sovereignty and also give more powers to the AU Commision and Pan-African Parliament for the greater good of the AU Supranational Project. As a result, AU’s credibility depends on structural reforms and on whether it can uphold the very principles it was founded upon such as human rights, justice, transparency, impartiality, integrity and unity. This will require action and very difficult policy decisions more than rhetoric to turn itself into a body that Africans respect and the world takes seriously. The AU must demonstrate its willingness to act decisively when democracy or peace is under threat, whether in Sudan, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, DRC, Chad, Uganda or Gabon. If it fails to do so, it will render itself irrelevant in Africa’s political trajectory and leave room for other external actors to dictate the continent’s future. Youssouf’s leadership in the next four years will either be a turning point or yet another chapter in the organization’s continuous slow decline!