Why do political families dominate even in democratic countries? Across much of the Global South, electoral systems once seen as tools of liberation are becoming tools of consolidation for family dynasties, not the people. In 2024, most countries in the Asia-Pacific region were facing an election processes. Although the overall election process went relatively smooth, there was an interesting trend in the dynamics of elections in various Asia-Pacific countries. In Indonesia, the election of Gibran Rakabuming Raka as Vice President, has become one example to represent the trend of political dynasties that also occurred in various other countries, such as the Hasina Dynasty in Bangladesh, the Gandhi Dynasty in India, the Duterte and Marcos Dynasties in the Philippines.

Asia-Pacific: Deepening Dynastic Power

Today, the trend of political dynasties in Asia-Pacific countries are evolving faster than expected. That the democratic system turns out to provide space for the emergence of dynastic political practices. The democratic system is used by political dynasties to build careers for their family members to play a role in various public positions, such as by becoming party leaders, parliamentary positions, until occupying regional heads.

Recent studies have shown that political dynasties can occur among elected officials through democracy processes, whether when their relatives are currently serving in government or have served in the past (Cruz and Mendoza, 2015). In general, there are two patterns of political dynasties: first, family members filling the same positions that were ever filled by family members; or second, families filling a position simultaneously when other family members are still in office.

In responding to the dynastic political discourse, there are two divided views. There is a group that thinks in a democratic country, it gives guarantees to all people to have equal opportunities to run for political competitions. Proponents of this argument take the example of a number of democratic countries such as the United States and India, which saw the children of the Bush, Kennedy and Gandhi families elected through democratic elections.

Meanwhile, another group argues more critically. The antithesis for these other groups is that political dynasty elites born do not go through a regeneration process and a political career path. They only receive political and economic access from the first generation of family. The entry of elites from political dynasties is also considered not to create space for meritocracy or equal and fair political competition for other figures.

Why Political Dynasties Thrive (or Don’t)

The question is, why can political dynasties successfully survive and thrive in countries that are considered democratic? The findings of Kenawas (2015) show the strength of informal family networks and the ability to manage power. Starting with relying on the capital of blood relations of family members of the incumbent makes political dynasties able to survive strongly in competition, especially at the regional level.

When family members who are part of a political dynasty begin to have influence, the political dynasty further strengthens itself by building informal political networks in various sectors whose activities are strengthened by the capacity of material assets that have been accumulated by other family members. This creates unlimited and interconnected resources in a network of clientelism. Therefore, it is no wonder that material political dynasties have such a large and strong influence in the process of formulating political policies in developing countries.

This is in line with how Hasina's political dynasty developed, which began by gaining influence from her populist program. To maintain this influence, Hasina and her cadres in the Awami League carried out large-scale persecution of the opposition who were considered against her policies. Hasina used the instruments of the police and the judiciary to close the opportunity for her opponents to provide an alternative discourse on the future of Bangladesh. Hasina also strengthens her stronghold of power by ensuring that family members and all cronies who help consolidate the Hasina dynasty's political and economic power in Bangladesh serve in various public and corporate positions in Bangladesh.

While for the case of Indonesia, political dynasties initially developed rapidly at the local government level, specifically after President Soeharto era and the establishment of democracy in 1998-1999. Local elites who previously had access to old power managed to consolidate themselves quickly. With strong economic resources and long-established political networks, political dynasty elites managed to become “new elites” in the regions and then crawled to the national level. Therefore the “newborn elites” from political dynasties have a tendency to “make a career” in the same region as the initial generation. This makes it easier to gain public support and votes in elections because they already have loyal supporters.

As a result, the increasing number of politicians from dynastic families has made a big difference in shaping the elite structure in Indonesia today. The businessman-politician elite, which strengthened in the 2000s, is now starting to be shifted by the dynastic politician elite. Meanwhile, the number of political elites who come from activist groups, professionals and academics continues to decline. This is also worsened by limited capital, low popularity, and high political costs, due to the use of an open proportional system in legislative elections. Therefore, the results of Kenawas research (2023) state that the number of political dynasties in Indonesia is growing three times faster between 2010 and 2018.

The same pattern also occurs in the Philippines. The most obvious case, for example, is the Duterte family. Rodrigo Duterte is a former President of the Philippines who built a political career starting from congressman, vice mayor and mayor, to president. He was once the Mayor of Davao City, a city with the fifth largest population in the Philippines. When he became president, his daughter Sara became mayor of the same city. In 2022, Sara, who was still a mayor, ran as a vice-presidential candidate when Duterte was still president. Sara managed to win the vice-presidential election with more than 50 percent of the votes, thus pairing her with Bong Bong, the son of Ferdinand Marcos.

Based on those various cases, it supports the research results of several studies which conclude that the longer a person serves or is in power, the more likely it is to build a political dynasty (Dal Bo, Dal Bo, and Snyder, 2009; Coppenolle, 2017).

Latin America : Constitutional Resistance

Then, compared to countries in Latin America, there has been a tendency to limit dynastic politics for a long time. In fact, ideally, political dynasties are commonly found and rise in countries that are still undergoing democratic consolidation–mostly associated with monarchy, where government institutions and legal frameworks are still stabilizing. Thus, the dominance of the power system is inherited based on blood lineage. However, many Latin American countries, which had just become democracies in the late 1970s and early 1980s, have adopted anti-dynastic politics policies, so that the level of democratization of countries in Latin America has increased and strengthened.

Most countries in Latin America have adopted restrictive or prohibitive rules for political dynasties since the third wave of democratization. Honduras adopted it in 1982, followed by El Savador (1983), Guatemala (1985), Nicaragua (1987), Brazil (1990), Colombia (1991) and Paraguay (1992). Even the oldest regulation comes from Costa Rica's 1949 constitution, which prohibits relatives of former presidents and vice presidents from running for the highest government office and also prohibits family members two levels below them from running in legislative elections. In fact, in the latest constitution, presidential and vice-presidential candidates cannot be family members (blood/marriage relations) of the current or former president and vice president.

So, why are countries with relatively new democratic systems able to avoid the practice of political dynasties in their elections?

This phenomenon is inseparable from the implementation of a strong and progressive-innovative party system. A strong party system will prevent parties from seeking popular figures in order to survive the intense electoral competition. Political recruitment through a meritocratic process aims to produce qualified political cadres, so that it will break political parties from traditional practices based on regeneration on blood relations or family descent which are only used for short-term needs to face elections.

Because only a poor and outdated party system, combined with open political opportunities, as well as access to power and the economy, will support the flourishing of political dynasties. As a result, the elites of political dynasties managed to consolidate themselves and expand into many parties with the capital of popularity and political and economic access. The party should be the locus of political competition with its progress innovations, but with a weak party system, the party is nothing more than a family gathering place that has no competition in it.

The Future Challenges

Thus, comparing Global South countries in the Asia-Pacific region with relatively longer and more established democratic systems shows a trend of strengthening political dynasty practices. On the other hand, in the Latin American region, the initiative to practice political dynasties is strictly regulated and limited in its constitution has been going on for a long time.

This means that the momentum of democratization can be manipulated by the existence of political elites who understand the democratic political arena as a way to co-opt actors in an open political system, by implementing the practice of political dynasty itself. Political interventions can be made by political dynasties at any time when they feel that their dominance is challenged by the opposition. This ultimately explains the rapid evolution of the structure and composition of elites and the level of political competition in Asia-Pacific countries.

This phenomenon also confirms the thesis of Yoes Kenawas (2015) who argues that the nature of democracy, which provides opportunities for political actors to play the widest possible role in the political system, is the key to the growth of dynastic politics.

The strengthening role of political dynasty elites is certainly a challenge in the development of democracy in the future, especially in providing a space for equal competition and preventing potential for increased corruption in political dynasty practices. On that basis, in a democratic country, it requires the courage and bravery of the role of political parties through their parliamentary power to form a constitution that is able to regulate and minimize the impact of dynastic politics, because a healthy party system can play a major role in reducing, and even eliminating, the practice of political dynasties.

If democracy in the Global South is to remain meaningful, political power must be earned not inherited. The future of democratic renewal depends on breaking these blood-bound cycles through stronger parties, institutional reform, and collective civic vigilance.

Note: The cover image accompanying this article was generated using artificial intelligence and is intended for illustrative purposes only