On 11 June 2025, Indonesia’s Defence Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin and Turkey’s President of Defence Industry Agency (SSB) Haluk Gorgun signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) regarding the arms transfer of 48 Turkish KAAN fifth-generation jet fighters to the Indonesian military, a deal estimated to be worth approximately 10 billion USD. However, no formal contract has yet been finalised between the two parties. Moreover, no negotiations on other critical technical details, such as technology transfer and joint production arrangements, have yet commenced. The official contract is expected to address all these elements, including the confirmation of the exact number of aircraft to be delivered. Despite these apparent uncertainties, the signing of the MoU reveals some significance.

Turkey’s Trickle-Down Middle Power Strategy

Turkey’s defence industry rise has allowed the country to distinguish itself from its fellow middle powers. Although its defence industry still does not match the scale of global major arm manufacturers, the Turkish defence industry has been growing significantly. Turkey increased its share of the global arms export market to 1.7% in 2020-2024, marking a 103% growth from its previous 0.8% share in the 2015–2019 period, according to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). In a relatively short period, Turkey has managed to master cutting-edge defence systems across land, air, and naval domains and produce them indigenously. Furthermore, Turkey managed to build some smart munitions such as Bora and Tayfun ballistic missiles and Atma and Cakir long-range cruise missiles.

Turkey’s defence industry advancement is widely perceived as a pivotal mechanism for mitigating ongoing financial challenges and for facilitating the attainment of strategic autonomy. The advancement in military technology and capabilities have allowed Turkey to transform itself into a key regional actor, exerting considerable military and strategic influence across multiple regions. These include the Middle East North and Sub-Saharan Africa  as well as the Gulf and Central Asia These developments illustrate how Turkey’s defence capabilities have translated into geopolitical leverage, reinforcing its status as a prominent  middle power. The case of Turkey showcases how enhanced defence capabilities can serve as a means for middle powers not only to safeguard security, but also to achieve strategic autonomy. Thischallenges the traditional notion of middle powers as mere mediators or intermediaries in international politics.

Another interesting dimension of Turkey’s defence sector advancement is that it does not confine its success to national interests alone. Instead, Turkey has been utilising arms transfer to boost the country’s influence amongst other middle powers. Over the past decade, Turkey has significantly expanded its defence cooperation with countries such as , Malaysia, Pakistan, Indonesia and the UAE. These partnerships, involving technology transfer, joint production, and strategic exports, particularly in unmanned systems, naval platforms, and munitions, reflect Turkey’s growing role as both a defence exporter and enabler of regional military-industrial development. This suggests greater room for those countries in pursuing strategic autonomy as reliance on their conventional arms suppliers could be potentially reduced. The abovementioned collaborations have allowed Turkey to foster strategic alignment, technological interdependence, and regional security architecture diversification. This circumstance likely suggests that strategic autonomy is not only achieved through domestic capacity-building but also through the “trickle-down" process. In this case, the experiences of more advanced middle powers, such as Turkey, support and inspire the strategic objectives of others seeking similar autonomy.

However, despite its defence industry breakthrough, Turkey maintains industrial interconnectedness with other major global arms dealers. The circumstance thus provides some kind of assurance for brokering arms transfer with Turkey without any fear of being completely sidelined by major global arm manufacturers.

An Early Indicator of Indonesia’s Continued Military Modernisation Ambition

In his 2024 presidential election campaign manifesto, Prabowo Subianto underlined the importance of integrating self-sufficiency and economic sovereignty. The idea indicates the president’s desire not only to increase defence capability, but also to boost self-sufficiency in the defence sector. This suggests there is an intention to fulfil, or at least improve, Indonesia’s defence self-reliance.

The defence cooperation with Turkey, notably arms transfers, can be part of the effort to realise defence self-reliance. President Prabowo’s budget efficiency – which affected various ministries and government institutionsseems not to be affecting the defence sector. Defence ministry officials assured that the budget efficiency in the ministry would not involve defence acquisitions, operational activities, and platform maintenance.

The KAAN jet fighters procurement MOU signing hints at the continuation of Indonesia’s military modernisation initiative. Following his meeting with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Ankara in April 2025, Prabowo expressed Indonesia’s intention to participate in the joint development of Turkey’s fifth generation jet fighters, KAAN. The plan to acquire KAAN jet fighters does not only showcase Prabowo’s intention to continue Indonesia’s military modernisation, but also the president’s impulse towards grandeur military procurement. For him, military procurement is both about strategic necessity and prestige. Such propensity is in line with his ambition to improve Indonesia’s stature and his own portrayal as a strong leader. The KAAN MOU also appears to suggest that defence, including military modernisation, is amongst the top priorities of the Prabowo administration.

Previously, Indonesia’s pursuit of arms modernisation was encapsulated under the so-called Minimum Essential Force (MEF) programme, which ended in 2024. Since then, Indonesia has not yet officially formulated a follow-up modernisation programme. During his time as defence minister, Prabowo  proposed the so-called Nusantara Trident Shield modernisation programme. Nevertheless, no official policy has been announced so far. Despite the seeming uncertainty, the KAAN jet fighters' MOU signing has at least reinvigorated the spirit to modernise the Indonesian military.

The idea to procure KAAN jet fighters will add a new tool to Indonesia’s already colourful arsenal. Prior to KAAN, Indonesia had already showcased its intention to procure Rafale jet fighters from France. Indonesia’s bitter arms embargo by the United States during the 1990s to the 2000s has significantly shaped Indonesia’s defence procurement policy. While such a procurement strategy can reduce the dependency towards major arms manufacturers, it can cause logistical  nightmares and maintenance and interoperability challenges. This means that Indonesia may require a longer time to be able to fit new platforms to work properly with the existing platforms.

The KAAN MOU contains a potential transfer of technology, which is crucial to support the development of Indonesia’s defence industry. Acquiring jet fighter technology is one of the priorities of Indonesia’s defence industry program, according to Presidential Regulations 8/2021. Nonetheless, transfer of technology alone requires other components, such as adequate human resources and proper supporting facilities, to produce fruitful outcomes.

The potential procurement of the 48 KAAN jet fighters also showcased Prabowo’s impulse towards grandeur military procurement. For him, military procurement is both about strategic necessity and prestige. Such propensity is in line with his ambition to improve Indonesia’s stature and his own portrayal as a strong leader. The KAAN MOU also appears to suggest that defence, including military modernisation, is amongst the top priorities of the Prabowo administration.

Concluding Thoughts

Based on the above discussion, we can take at least three key takeaways. First, Turkey’s rising profile in the global defence market has been accompanied by a search for new potential markets. Compared to major powers, Turkey adopts a relatively less selective approach in exporting defence equipment, making it more accessible to countries like Indonesia. Second, military agreements between two middle powers, such as Turkey and Indonesia, do not compel Indonesia to align itself with any particular bloc in global politics. For middle powers that traditionally pursue a “hedging policy,” like Indonesia, this allows for a valuable degree of neutrality. Lastly, the case hints a possible ‘trickle down’ pursuit of strategic autonomy that induced and inspired by one middle power to another. This suggests that strategic autonomy can be replicated through partnerships rather than achieved solely through independent struggle.