Between July and August 2025, the UK, France, Canada, and Australia that they would recognize the State of Palestine, with the condition that Hamas stepped down from governing Gaza. The headlines celebrated a significant long-awaited diplomatic breakthrough. For many, it seemed like a long-overdue nod to Palestinian statehood after decades and decades of conflict. Yet behind the headlines lies a very sharp political calculation. The condition for recognition is not a side note; it is the core of the deal. It ensures that the only Palestinian body recognized internationally would be the Palestinian Authority (PA) in Ramallah, an institution that has neither presence nor legitimacy in Gaza.

Recognition is frequently portrayed as symbolic, a gesture of moral support for self-determination. But, in this case, it serves as a geopolitical tool. By tying it to the removal of a specific political faction, Western governments are attempting to reshape Gaza’s political order before the Palestinians themselves can decide who represents them. It is a preemptive strike in the political arena, made in foreign capitals, not in Palestinian streets or through ballot boxes.

The alignment behind this approach is very striking. Muslim-majority states like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Egypt, despite publicly condemning Israel’s continued military operations in Gaza, have also urged Hamas to relinquish power. But instead of insisting on national reconciliation through free and fair elections, their political pressure mirrors that of Western governments: install the PA as the only sole authority. The result is a very rare convergence between Arab capitals and Western powers on a single point: regime change in Gaza without the consent of those who live there.

Hamas: More Than Its Armed Wing

In much of Western media, Hamas is reduced to its military operations and also attacks on Israel. Yet governance in Gaza is not sustained by military power alone. According to research published in the Journal of Palestine Studies, Hamas has also built  a lot of significant institutional capacity over decades, especially in the delivery of social services  that include healthcare, education, and humanitarian aid. These are not only fringe activities, they form the backbone of daily survival in a territory that is under blockade and subject to repeated bombardment.

Even international agencies like UNRWA have coordinated with Hamas-linked authorities for aid distribution because these structures exist, function, and reach the people in need. For many Gazans, support for Hamas is pragmatic rather than just ideological. It reflects the fact that, in the absence of functioning PA institutions, Hamas is present, accessible, and capable of delivering basic services. Removing Hamas without replacing its governance infrastructure risks creating a vacuum, one that the PA is in no position to fill.

The Palestinian Authority: A State Without a Base

The PA is frequently described as the “legitimate representative” of the Palestinian people, but its governance model is strongly dependent on external lifelines. Anas Iqtait describes it as a “non-oil rentier state,” with almost 80 percent of its budget coming from foreign donors and also from Israeli-controlled tax transfers (Iqtait, 2020). This dependency defines and shapes almost every aspect of its political economy. Its primary accountability is not to its citizens but it is instead  geared to its funders, whose priorities frequently focus on stability as well as security cooperation with Israel rather than  on democratic governance or economic development for Palestinians.

This donor-driven model distorts state-building. Instead of delivering public services based on domestic needs, the PA’s institutions compete for donor-funded projects. Ministries measure success by compliance with International Monetary Fund or European Union benchmarks rather than by the well-being of their constituents. The result is a very hollowed-out public sector that functions more like the administrative arm of an international aid consortium than a Palestinian national government. As long as the PA maintains order and files clean financial reports, its political legitimacy at home is treated as irrelevant.

Post-War Scenarios: Planning Without the People

The future of Gaza is already being mapped out by policymakers that libe abroad. Dennis Byman outlines four possible scenarios after the war: direct Israeli reoccupation, a chaotic, ungoverned space, an international technocracy, or PA control (Byman, 2024). Of these, the Western governments are betting on the fourth. This choice persists despite very open acknowledgment that the PA has neither the infrastructure nor the popular trust to govern Gaza effectively.

The PA’s return to Gaza would be less a reconciliation project than a political imposition. It would arrive under the protective and strong umbrella of Western recognition, armed with the promise of donor funds instead of a democratic mandate. Such governance would rely heavily on security enforcement as well as external backing rather than on organic popular support. Political dissent in this context would very likely be framed as destabilization, creating conditions for renewed repression instead of genuine political inclusion.

Who Gains from Conditional Recognition?

Recognition under these terms is not a victory for Palestinian unity or a step toward genuine sovereignty. It is a transactional arrangement that is strategically designed to stabilize the region in a way that serves the interests of existing power alliances interested in the issue. In this arrangement, Israel avoids dealing with Hamas, Western states secure a  very cooperative counterpart in the PA, and Arab governments gain a diplomatic talking point without confronting the deep rooted issues of occupation and blockade.

For Palestinians, however, the risk is the emergence of a very hollow state, recognized internationally but also disconnected from its people. In such a kind of scenario, Gaza would be governed by an authority that many residents neither elected nor trust at all. The West Bank and Gaza would remain politically divided, their internal reconciliation delayed indefinitely. The core political problem, the absence of a legitimate, unified Palestinian leadership chosen by its citizens, would still likely remain unresolved.

Recognition as a Political Contract

Conditional recognition reframes Palestinian statehood not as the culmination of a liberation movement but rather as a kind of an externally designed administrative arrangement. It defines legitimacy through compliance with external conditions instead of through strong domestic consent. This is statehood as a political contract between interested foreign powers and their allies, the PA, not as the expression of the Palestinian people’s will.

Unless recognition is coupled with an inclusive political process that allows Palestinians themselves to determine their leadership and governance structures, it will serve as a mechanism of control rather than liberation. True statehood cannot be granted in exchange for the removal of a political faction at the request of foreign states. It must be claimed through the collective will of the people it represents.

The recognition promised in 2025 is therefore not a neutral diplomatic milestone. It is a political bargain, one in which sovereignty is defined elsewhere, for the sake of stability that benefits others. Until that fundamental imbalance is addressed, recognition will remain what it is today: a contract written for geopolitical convenience, not for historical justice.