Shortly after the COP29 concluded, I wrote an article about how Indonesia missed the climate leadership opportunity at the UN climate summit. But now, a question arises: can Indonesia truly exercise its climate leadership role or benefit much from the multilateral forums? – the answer is yes, it can, and I will explain why this opportunity may also come through its latest move to join BRICS. Shortly after taking office in October, Prabowo Subianto made it a top priority for Indonesia to formally join BRICS—which stands for Brazil, Russia, India, and China, with South Africa joining one year later. While some are questioning this swift decision, I believe BRICS can provide Indonesia with better visibility as a major player in South-South cooperation, boost its prominence as a middle power, and—above all—show that its "bebas dan aktif" (or "free and active") foreign policy is still relevant amidst growing geopolitical fragmentation.  

Indonesia's "free and active" foreign policy is unique as it continues to provide the country with a distinctive and adaptive posture in the face of geopolitical uncertainties. Adhering to its foreign policy, Indonesia can always maintain a cautious yet steady balance among rival great powers, thus providing the country with more flexibility over international cooperation. Drawing on Mohammad Hatta’s speech "Rowing Between Two Reefs", Indonesian foreign policy should always be in the middle and prioritize its own national interests over other countries’. 

But the world is confronting even more uncertain geopolitical changes with Donald Trump returning to power and so far has kept his word, such as withdrawing the United States from the Paris Agreement and halting all climate-related funding initiatives, including firing hundreds of positions at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and completely shutting down the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).  

The good news is that being a climate champion does not always depend on who has the most money. In contrast to hard power, where a country's military might and weaponry count the most, demonstrating climate leadership and excelling in its diplomacy is a form of soft power where cooperation and fostering relationships between nations to address climate change are the most important. The United States is a good example of a wealthy nation that fails to demonstrate meaningful climate leadership because its national interest is no longer there. Recently, the US Senate and House also suggested that the Pentagon once more divert $377.35 million climate funds for other purposes. As a result, the United States still tops the world's economy but remains the second-largest emitter and is now losing its decades of internationalism as foreign development spending is gradually cut under the current administration.  

This example demonstrates that while financial resources are significant, they are not the primary determinant. Instead, climate leadership requires a nation that can demonstrate the greatest optimism in the face of geopolitical problems. With the US absent, Indonesia can step in by reassuring the Global South that the "show must go on, and moving on to advancing South-South cooperation through BRICS, where the voices of developing nations will be better accommodated.   

Indonesia's BRICS membership is already an important step forward but this alone will not be enough. To be seen as a country that demonstrates climate optimism, Indonesia must first determine its own national interest in climate and renewables. 

Climate leadership begins at home   

Foreign policy begins at home.  

The theory was popularized by Richard N. Haass, who stated that a country can play an effective role in the international arena as long as its government has a solid foundation at home. This also applies when Indonesia aims to succeed in its climate diplomacy overseas or decides to take an effective role within international forums where the country participates.  

However, despite owning a renewable energy potential of up to 333 GW, the country faces a paradoxical situation in which renewable energy share remains low. In 2014, renewable energy accounted for 7 per cent of the total energy supply in Indonesia. Ten years later, renewable energy share stood at a mere 14,5 per cent, still falling short of the 23 per cent target set in the 2014 National Energy Policy (KEN). At the latest, the Indonesian National Energy Council (DEN) lowered the renewable energy share to 17-19 per cent by 2025, down from the 23 per cent target. Obviously, this does not demonstrate a solid foundation at home when the renewable energy share objective can be lowered based on achieving only the least ambitious scenario.  

Chinese corporations currently also control 75 per cent of Indonesian nickel capacity, which should raise concerns about excessive foreign supply chain dominance. Unfortunately, this has also underscored Indonesia's lack of a strategic national interest in its critical mineral and renewable energy supply chains. Between 2006 and 2022, Chinese investments in Indonesia reached an astonishing USD 35 billion, of which only 25 per cent was allocated to renewable sources. If Indonesia has put climate on top of its national interest, it should have directed a greater portion of its foreign investment toward clean energy initiatives.  

As China’s second largest investment partner and main recipient of the Belt and Road Initiative investment, Indonesia should keep China close as its strategic partner on clean energy initiatives. Nonetheless, keeping with its "free and active" foreign policy principle, the country should always consider "how this partnership can enhance not only our economic growth but also support our national interest in climate and clean energy; and to what extent?" 

Indonesia can benefit much from BRICS only when it recognizes its national interest 

Indonesia officially joined BRICS on January 6th and took a seat in its New Development Bank. This decision should not be interpreted lightly as an effort to shift away from Western-dominated economic forums because, regardless, the country still requires significant investment of USD 20-40 billion annually to support its decarbonization goal by 2050. Given the increasing global uncertainty, I see Indonesia's BRICS membership as a political diversification strategy that will strengthen its global bargaining power and solidify its self-sufficiency amidst future unpredictability.  

It is true that even before BRICS, Indonesia founded several independent forums with the Global South nations, such as the Indonesia-Pacific Forums for Development Countries (IPFD) and Indonesia-Africa Forum (IAF) among others, where the middle power position can also be exercised. But why limit strategic collaboration when its distinctive foreign policy allows Indonesia to broaden its influence in bigger multilateral forums? In 2014, the country's commerce with BRICS nations reached $150 billion, underscoring the bloc's importance as a trading partner. Beyond economic gains, BRICS can also pave the way for Indonesia to deepen bilateral ties with China and India, which have taken steps ahead in clean energy.  

For decades, Indonesian foreign policy has prevailed and proven its exceptional ability to swiftly adjust to arenas that provide further advantages. Nonetheless, the country can only reap the benefits of its BRICS membership if it truly acknowledges its national interest in climate and is willing to integrate this strategic agenda into the cooperation. Without solid domestic policies and a strong national interest in place, BRICS will be no different than any other multilateral forum and funding opportunities from NDB will most likely be funneled back into fossil fuels.   

The opinions stated do not necessarily represent the organization she may be associated with.