Whenever a big power chooses a transactional approach in international engagement, smaller states in these relationships have to take a step back on their important, often strategic goals. Transactionalism, as a quid pro quo approach, renders reciprocal exchanges as an essential means of interaction where one state has to offer something of value to another in exchange for support or services it gets. It brings big powers into a position of dictation where they get to decide the rules of engagement for their dependent states which often happens between asymmetric power positions. This type of engagement has multiple precedents in the history of international relations where big states such as the United States, China, and Russia have forsaken their allies to secure a big share of advantage in return for their economic and military shelter.  

Trump’s recent transactional turn toward Taiwan is yet another example of this kind of engagement in asymmetric state relations in international politics. His infamous remarks before coming to the office that “Taiwan should pay us for defence” (Davidson, 2024) against China and that Taiwan “doesn’t give us anything” (Satake, 2024) alludes to his potential transactional approach towards Taiwan as he comes to the office. 

The US-Taiwan relation is deeply rooted in historic engagement in terms of political support, economic backing, and security guarantees. Taiwan has remained a strategic ally of the US in the backdrop of the communist onslaught on Asia while supporting it economically and militarily to strengthen its position in facing communist threats. The US post-Cold War support for Taiwan also remained unwavering which helped Taiwan build economic muscle and become the global technological hub. 

In the face of Chinese aggression, the U.S. also ensured its firm support to Taiwan to the point of physically protecting it from potential Chinese attacks as stated by the former president Joe Biden. However, things have been taking an unprecedented shift in historic the US-Taiwan relation. President Trump is assuming office with his characteristic transactional approach which gauge bilateral relations on an equal exchange of material value. In the case of Taiwan, Trump aims to seek economic benefits or technological share in technological advancement citing concerns over Taiwan’s monopoly over the semiconductor industry as he went on to say “Taiwan has taken over almost 100% of the US semiconductor industry” (Satake, 2024). This behavioral change seeks to demand Taiwan a fair share of return in their relationship. This alludes to many potential shifts that could hamper Taiwan’s fragile position in the face of categorical threats coming from China to bring it under their territory by the year 2027 (Gazis, 2023). 

With regards to the relationship with Taiwan under Trump’s last term, the US maintained its historic support of the island as a strategic ally where he permitted $18 billion in the arms trade and extended engagement in strengthening ties in fields of technology, healthcare, and energy but the state policy stance remained that of “strategic ambiguity.” It never gave assurance to the island of security guarantee should China ever make a move of using force against Taiwan. Trump’s new term comes with conditional support as he asserts his concerns over Taiwan receiving US aid and not “paying off”. This approach leaves little room for Taiwan to maintain relations as before because it does not possess the means that keep it in a position to dictate the rules of engagement. Taiwan’s position mirrors the similar fate of all the smaller states that come into the quid pro quo relationship with more powerful counterparts.

The Question of Taiwan’s Independence

Responding to Trump’s transactional calls, Taiwan’s premier has illustrated that “Taiwan is grateful for US support” and that “Taiwan is working hard to maintain the relationship” (Ani, 2024) which shows their submissive position from where he comes to respond to the big power’s demand. A potential new shift in the relationship presents various obstacles that Taiwan has to contend with, the biggest being China’s increasing aggression toward their newly elected pro-independence premier. 

Taiwan’s quest for independence is rooted in its unique history of separating from mainland China and building a state based on a distinct political and economic identity different from its former rulers. The efforts for independence face both internal and external challenges. Domestically, the country has mainly two political groups, one advocating maintaining the status quo under the 1992 consensus or gradually making efforts to reunify with mainland China. This group is known as the Pan-Blue Coalition. The other group, on the other hand, hails the idea of complete independence from their former colonial masters. This group is referred to as the Pan-Green Coalition (Tan, 2019). Taiwan’s new president is from the latter group who confidently lauds his pro-independence beliefs and describes himself as a “practical worker for Taiwan independence” and has reiterated that “Taiwan is already an independent country and that Taiwan’s people can decide their future”. 

On an external level, China is the biggest hurdle for Taiwan to attain full-fledged independence. China considers Taiwan a breakaway province for which it will keep making efforts to reunify it with where it belongs even if they have to consider using force. Their views that Taiwan is an inseparable part of China under the One-China principle is acknowledged by the majority of states in the international community including the United States. Although China has not categorically cleared its intention to reunify Taiwan in the near future, its preparation for taking a serious move against it in 2027 has been reiterated by many US intelligence and security officials in recent years. High Ranking officials including CIA Director William Burns, and head of Defence Intelligence Agency Lt. Gen. Jeffery Kruse have hinted towards their intelligence that Xi has instructed his army to be “ready by 2027 to conduct a successful invasion of Taiwan in 2027” (Gazis, 2023). How much truth lies in this recurrent intelligence shared by the top officials of the US security personnel has yet to be witnessed but it nevertheless poses a credible threat for Taiwan to be wary of.    

The United States' support for Taiwan against Chinese aggression has remained long-term as the US has continued its arms sales since 1979 and has reiterated its political commitment to safeguarding its position so much so that the previous Biden Administration categorically stated that United States forces will defend Taiwan in the event of China’s invasion. However, Trump’s new administration suggests an unexpected shift in their historical relationship that shadows these claims. In fact, it leads their relationship towards uncertain roads and its quest for independence in precarious situations ever. 

Although a clear policy roadmap has not been presented by the Trump Administration concerning Taiwan yet, the policymakers and researchers have proclaimed their assumptions suggesting where their relationship could lead. Satake, (2024) notes that Trump’s second term is going to put pressure on Taiwan to increase its defence spending and make more purchases of arms from the United States. Others have furthered the concerns that Trump demanding Taiwan to increase the spending in the military and accusing it of stealing US jobs in the semiconductor industry suggest that Taiwan has to pay more for the support it gets from the U.S. this time (Chang, 2024). Ogasawara (2024) alludes to a dangerous future for Taiwan in the face of Trump’s assertive stance referring that many pro-Taiwan officials have left his cabinet which underscores uncertainty about the nature of the relationship between the two countries. 

Against the backdrop of the increasingly fragile nature of the US-Taiwan relationship and China’s escalating aggression, Taiwan’s position seems worrisome. As suggested by Satake, (2024) Taiwan should navigate proactive measures very carefully in the face of potential shifts coming from their all-weather friend U.S. The trade relations should be diversified which will reduce their dependency on the United States and China, giving them leverage over their economic partners. Strengthening their military capabilities also needs priority handling which will ensure resilience in the face of regional threats. Investing in their economy and military might provide them a broader room to navigate the volatility in US foreign policy and will keep them in a more stable position in maintaining their economic stability, political sanctity, and sovereignty.