Trump’s second term puts Southeast Asia at a crossroads. The escalating tensions between U.S. and China have reshaped economic and security dynamics in the region, forcing Southeast Asian nations to reconsider their strategic alliances.

As Trump returns to the White House, his “America First” policies, both domestically and abroad, are expected to deepen regional divisions, compelling some countries to strengthen ties with Washington while others gravitate toward Beijing.

Countries like the Philippines and Singapore, which have traditionally leaned toward the U.S., may seek stronger security and economic ties, while those benefiting from China’s infrastructure and trade initiatives will reinforce their strategic partnerships with Beijing.

Southeast Asian countries now prefer to align more with China than with the U.S. According to a poll conducted by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, among all ASEAN members, only Singapore, the Philippines, and, interestingly, Vietnam, would prefer the U.S. over China.

This evolving international landscape may heighten competition in trade, investments and security alignments, prompting ASEAN members to make more strategic recalibrations in their foreign policies. But this does not necessarily mean divisions among Southeast Asian nations themselves, as they generally maintain pragmatic relations with one another.

Southeast Asia is not an isolated case in the global landscape, as the U.S. is now moving towards unilateral actions over multilateral diplomacy, and Trump is going to exacerbate this position. With this approach, Trump could encourage more countries worldwide, including Southeast Asia, to focus more on regional cooperation and self-reliance.

Rather than turning entirely inward, Southeast Asian states are likely to double down on ASEAN-driven initiatives, reinforcing economic integration, trade agreements, and security integration. While some of the countries may implement protectionist policies in certain sectors, this will not come at the expense of ASEAN’s role as a platform for collective bargaining and strategic autonomy in an increasingly multipolar world.

By the start of 2025, Indonesia became the first Southeast Asian nation to formally join BRICS. While former President Joko Widodo was hesitant to join BRICS as it would jeopardize Indonesia’s non-alignment policy, it became the priority of President Prabowo Subianto after entering office in October.

Indonesia became the first country to accept BRICS membership, while Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam remain “Official BRICS Partner Countries.” Aligning with BRICS offers Indonesia leverage in the multipolar world order but also risks entangling the country in the intensifying geopolitical rivalry between China, a key player in BRICS, versus Western powers.

Indonesia’s membership could set a precedent for other Southeast Asian nations to follow, especially if it demonstrates benefits such as increased trade, investment opportunities, and technological cooperation with emerging economies like China, India, and Brazil. However, this shift may exacerbate existing divisions in Southeast Asia, particularly concerning sensitive issues such as the South China Sea dispute.

With another four years of Trump at the helm of U.S. foreign policy, his administration would likely continue its unpredictable yet assertive stance against China, pressuring allies such as the Philippines, Vietnam, and Taiwan. This would include an increased military presence and ongoing maritime patrols to reinforce the U.S. commitment to upholding international law in the disputed waters.

The key difference between the Biden and Trump administration's lies in their approach to the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling, which invalidated China’s expansive claims in the South China Sea. While both administrations upheld the ruling and rejected China’s claims, their strategies differed. The Biden administration placed greater emphasis on multilateralism, working with ASEAN and Quad partners to uphold maritime security.

In contrast, Trump’s approach was more unilateral and transactional, offering stronger security commitments to certain allies like the Philippines and Vietnam but without consistent regional strategy. This unpredictability shows that U.S. support is conditional on immediate political or economic returns rather than long-term strategic stability.

During Trump’s first term as president, his engagement with Southeast Asia was inconsistent. He skipped several ASEAN summits and showed limited interest in formal diplomatic processes (Tang & Ong, 2019). This lack of commitment was further highlighted by the U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Shortly after the U.S. exited the pact, China applied to join the TPP, now known as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).

Outside the Malay Archipelago, Trump is unlikely to offer large-scale economic investments in Indochina. Cambodia and Laos, already closely tied to Beijing, are unlikely to see significant changes in their economic landscapes as the U.S. continues its increased competition with China.

Overall, a second Trump presidency would have a significant and complex impact on the region, particularly in areas of trade tensions with China, security and geopolitics, influence in global institutions and diplomatic relations.

It would likely be challenging for countries like Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, especially with Trump’s “America First” policy creating trade barriers or diplomatic tensions.

Meanwhile, this could likely be a win for countries like the Philippines, Singapore, and Malaysia, which could benefit from trade diversification and shifts in global supply chains due to rising tensions.

In Vietnam and Thailand, trade tensions between the two economic superpowers have created opportunities, leading to an increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) as businesses shift their manufacturing bases from China to these countries.

Malaysia and Indonesia may find themselves in a precarious position, playing it safe and neutral amidst U.S.-China conflicts and trade wars. They will need to balance their relationships with both superpowers based on their national stability. For Indonesia, as the ASEAN Secretariat’s seat holder, this neutrality allows it to lead the region and promote regional stability.